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I. Introduction
National identification cards are again in the news;1 in the wake
of the events of September 11, the political climate seems ripe for the
adoption of stricter identification measures.2 Proponents of such a
system point to its value as a tool for the protection of innocent
individuals3 and downplay its significance as a vehicle for monitoring
individual activities.4 Opponents fear the growing shadow of the
government’s surveillance schemes encroaching on the privacy of
individual citizens,5 particularly in light of the fact that such a system

1. Kathryn Balint, Attack on America: Personal Technology, San Diego Union
Tribune (Mar. 11, 2002) at E1, available at 2002 WL 4590778.
2. See Richard Sobel, The Degradation of Political Identity Under a National
Identification System, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 37, 41 (Winter 2002) (arguing that even
before September 11th, the intersection of a number of federally legislated databases was
already pushing us toward a National Identification System and contending that the postth
September 11 pressures will virtually ensure a widespread identification system). Polls
taken shortly after the attacks suggested that “70 percent of U.S. citizens favor[ed] the
creation of a national identification system.” U.S.-Attacks Oracle Offers Free Software for
National I.D. System, EFE NEWS SERVICE (Sep. 24, 2001) at ____, available at _____.
More recent polls suggest that support for such an invasive system is waning. The
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) reports that
[t]wo recently published polls show that support for a national ID card has
decreased. Results from a poll on the February 27 Washington Post Federal
Page showed that public opinion was divided on the issue, with 47% of
Americans believing a national ID “would make electronic transactions with the
government and business faster and more secure” and “would be an easier way
for people to verify their identity in places such as airports and government
offices,” while 44% thought of it as “a way to keep track of people” and “an
invasion of people’s civil liberties and privacy.” A new survey released on March
12 by Gartner Inc. found that 26 percent of Americans are in favor of a national
ID card, while 41 percent oppose the idea.
EPIC, National I.D. Cards, at <http://www.epic.org/privacy/id_cards/> (last visited Apr.
12, 2002). See also Julia Scheeres, Support for I.D. Cards Waning, WIRED, available at
<http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,51000,00.html> (last visited Apr. 12, 2002)
(noting that public acceptance of such a system hinges on the likely uses of the system).
3. See generally Thomas G. Donlan, “Secure in Their Persons”: A National Identity
Card is No Threat to Liberty, BARRON’s (Mar. 18, 2002) at 43, available at 2002 WLBARRONS 7653943.
st
4. See id. “But the fear is misplaced in the 21 century. Americans may fear tyranny,
and oppose every hint or possibility that it may emerge. But an identity card is not
tyranny, it is an identity card. Free citizens may very well wish to prove their identity, and
a government composed of free citizens may even require them to do so at times.”
5. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has continuously opposed national
identification cards, fearing that
[a] national I.D. card would essentially serve as an internal passport. It would
create an easy new tool for government surveillance and could be used to target
critics of the government, as has happened periodically throughout our nation’s
history. While the Social Security Act originally contained strict prohibitions
against use of the Social Security card for unrelated purposes, over the past 50
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would be unlikely to provide material limitations on terrorist
activities within the United States.6
As it stands, the government already has all of the resources that
are necessary to monitor individual citizens in all aspects of their daily
lives: omnipresent video cameras;7 extensive databases replete with
medical, financial, and criminal information;8 and facial matching
technology.9 Combined, this technology provides unprecedented
power to identify, record, and monitor the most intimate details of
human life: the places we go, the activities in which we engage, and
the people with whom we associate.10 Admittedly, this technology is

years those prohibitions have been ignored or legislated into oblivion and
restrictions on a national I.D. card would follow the same path.
ACLU, Why Does the ACLU Oppose a National I.D. System?, at <http://www.aclu.org/
library/aaidcard.html> (last visited Apr. 12, 2002). Notably, the context in which national
identification continually arose prior to September 11th was in relation to the need to
control illegal immigration. Id. The attacks of September 11 intensified the national
perception that identification cards are necessary to curb the movements of terrorists.
EPIC, National I.D. Cards, supra n. 2.
6. See id. (noting that “ID cards won’t thwart future terrorist attacks . . . because
the criminals will still be able to purchase fraudulent documents, such as birth certificates,
that would be needed to obtain the IDs. Privacy advocates also fear that the cards
themselves would act as a kind of national passport, allowing authorities to monitor
people’s movements and activities. EPIC and other groups believe that increased
information-sharing among government agencies is just as insidious as having to fork over
your ID card to cops who think you look ‘suspicious.’” ).
Project
Summary,
7. See
N.Y.C.
Surveillance
Camera
Project,
at
<http://www.mediaeater.com/cameras/summary.html> (last visited Apr. 12, 2002) (noting
that “[o]ver the last five months, a small but dedicated group of New York Civil Liberties
Union volunteers walked the streets of Manhattan in search of video surveillance cameras.
This group sought out every camera, public or private, which records people in public
space. From the records they made of the camera locations, the volunteers produced a
comprehensive map of all 2,397 surveillance cameras in Manhattan.”).
8 See Sobel, supra n. 2, at 41-45 (noting the omnipresence of databases available
today).
9. See infra nn. 83-89 and accompanying text.
10. For instance, consider the remarks made on a recent episode of the McLaughlin
Group:
MR. MCLAUGHLIN: To Americans, that chilling request is the image long
associated with national identity cards. But the image may be changing, as a
result of September 11th. A Harris Poll conducted immediately thereafter found
that 68 percent of Americans favored a national I.D. system. Even renowned
civil rights influentials support a national I.D. Quote, “We need to distinguish
between a right to privacy, which I believe in, and a right to anonymity, which I
no longer believe in,” unquote . . . . Under review are so-called smart cards,
especially biometric cards like scans of the retina and fingerprints. The scans are
linked to databases. The Department of Defense is already issuing smart cards
to more than 4 million service members.
Senator Dick Durbin of Illinois, a Democrat, has introduced a bill to create a
national standard for drivers’ licenses, which could become a de facto national
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not perfect;11 our privacy may currently be protected, to some extent,
by the technological and infrastructural limitations of these systems.12
This protection is of little comfort, however, given the rapid
improvements being made to the technology,13 and to the extent that
these systems are prone to error, a malfunctioning system may only
increase the likelihood that citizens will be subjected to false
identifications and harassment.14
The growth of biometric identification,15 and in particular facial
scanning technology,16 raises serious questions about the continued
longevity of a variety of Constitutional protections.
In this article, I argue that the deleterious effects of facial
scanning technology may be curtailed by distinguishing between wide
area facial scans17 and focused facial scans.18 Recognizing this
distinction, courts should determine that wide area scans are per se
unconstitutional, while focused scans serve a legitimate law

I.D. card. Representative Jim Moran, also a Democrat, will introduce a bill that
carries it a step further, requiring biometric data.
The McLaughlin Group (Broadcast, Mar. 30-31, 2002)
11. According to one privacy advocate,
[t]hose new converts to the cause of “security” may have switched sides too
soon. Modern surveillance cameras aren’t just monitored by bored policemen they’re often connected to computer software that’s supposed to “recognize”
faces stored in databases of criminal suspects. An ACLU study of Tampa’s
experience with the technology found that “the system made many false matches
between people photographed by police video cameras . . . and photographs in
the department’s database of criminals, sex offenders, and runaways.” That
shouldn’t be a surprise. In a 2000 U.S. Defense Department test of facerecognition products, reportedly the best false-detection rate found was 33
percent.
J.D. Tucille, The Fight Over Photos, available at <http://www.free-market.net/
spotlight/cameras/> (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
12. Id.
13 Barnaby J. Feder, Face-Recognition Technology Improves, N.Y. Times (March 14,
2003) C2.
14 A recent example of how the limitations of biometric identification could be
problematic for individuals was demonstrated in the relative ease that an individual could
be subjected to identity theft.
15. Biometric identification systems measure and analyze the physical characteristics
of the human body, including recognition of: fingerprints, handprints, voice patterns,
retinal patterns, brainwaves, physiognomy, etc.
16 The reason why facial scanning is so much more invidious than most other types of
biometric identification is the fact that an individual need not be aware that they are being
subjected to identification. Unlike a retinal, hand, or fingerprint scan, where an individual
must knowingly accede to identification, facial recognition is passive in that it requires no
knowledge on the part of the person being scanned.
17. See infra Part III.B.2.a.
18. See id.
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enforcement purpose when supported by a minimal level of suspicion
that a particular individual is engaged in criminal activity.
Part II of this article considers the background of biometric
identification, tracing the lineage of technological evolution from the
early approaches of criminologists to modern crime databases. The
section then moves to a consideration of the component parts of
facial scanning: surveillance, recognition, and information synthesis.
Part III considers the validity of facial scanning as a Fourth
Amendment event under the Constitution, examining critical cases
decided by the United States Supreme Court from United States v.
Katz through Kyllo v. United States. Part IV argues that the generic
category of facial scanning should be bifurcated into two different
types of scans: wide area scans and focused scans. It then proposes
that wide area scans should be severely limited or banned and that
focused scans should only be available to law enforcement when
police are seeking to identify or pinpoint the location of an individual
suspect for whom they have a minimal amount of suspicion or
knowledge of past or future criminal activity.

II. Background
A. The Historical Origins of Biometric Identification

Biometric identification is not a new phenomenon in law
enforcement. Almost as long as scientists have been aware that each
human being has certain physical attributes that are unique to that
individual, criminologists have taken advantage of that fact to aid
them in the investigation of crimes. The first recorded incident of
biometric identification was Alphonse Bertillon’s database of
criminals in Nineteenth Century Paris.19 Bertillon recorded various
physical statistics: the length of a criminal’s finger and the
circumference of his head in an effort to quickly identify recidivists.20
Bertillon’s system quickly evolved and the recognition of
fingerprints as a means of identification opened new doors for
investigating criminal activity.21 But the true breakthrough in
biometric databases has been the advent of the digital age.
A collection of information is only as useful as the ability to
organize it efficiently and access it rapidly. Moreover, the growing
st

19. Simon Garfinkel, Database Nation: The Death of Privacy in the 21 Century 40
(2000).
20. Id.
21. Simon Cole, A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification 11 (2001).
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transience of society makes it necessary to have multiple sinks of
information that are both self-contained and integrated. The
databases must be self-contained in order to quickly access a limited
amount of information based on its geographical relevance; it must be
integrated in order to allow law enforcement agencies to access a
broader field of information on individuals moving through different
jurisdictions.
The necessity of solving these two problems became clear to
police departments in the mid-1980s that were struggling under the
weight of excess information. In Los Angeles in 1985, a manual
match of an anonymous fingerprint would require an examination of
over 1.7 million fingerprint cards, a Sisyphean task for a single
worker.22
The answer to this problem is the utilization of a series of
decentralized but connected databases, known as a distributed
database.23 The distributed database achieves the two needs of law
enforcement by being both self-contained and interoperable. As a
result, local police can quickly identify a fingerprint by first checking
the print in their local computer system before broadening the scope
of the search to other jurisdictions.24
While fingerprinting is probably the most common and widely
known form of biometric identification, it is by no means the only
example. A variety of forms of biometric identification have now
become commonplace, including retinal recognition,25 handprint

22. See David Johnston, Computer Could Point Finger at Murderers: Automated
Searches Through Fingerprint Files Could Substantially Increase Arrests in L.A., L.A.
TIMES (June 28, 1985) at ____ (pointing out that the task of identifying a single fingerprint
using a computerized system could accomplish in five minutes what an individual
technician would need 67 years to complete).
23. According to the Institute for Telecommunications Sciences, a distributed
database is “not entirely stored at a single physical location, but rather is dispersed over a
network of interconnected computers.”). Institute for Telecommunications Sciences,
Definition of a Distributed Database, <http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-012/
_1750.htm> (last visited Apr. 2, 2002).
24. See generally Neil Munro and Elizabeth Frater, The Digital Dragnet, THE NAT’L
JOURNAL, Mar. 23, 2002, at 2002 WL 7094871:
There are between eight and 20 federal criminal databases, including the Justice
Department’s National Crime Information Center (which stores criminal records and
arrest warrants) and the Combined DNA Index System (which stores convicted felons’
DNA “fingerprints”). The nation’s 16,000-plus police jurisdictions also maintain an array
of databases . . . . These store data on more than 59 million individual offenders-far more than
the federal agencies store. . . . The nonfederal databases are increasingly linked to local
government databases created by municipal courts, parole services, and public defenders’ offices.
25. For instance, the state of Kansas has tentatively approved a change to the
issuance of driver’s licenses that would contain biometric identifiers. See Chris Ochsner,
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scans,26 and DNA matching.27 In addition, other databases have
proliferated throughout the public and private sectors that contain a
vast quantity of somewhat overlapping information.28 As a result, a
surprisingly complete portrait of an individual can be gleaned from
the trivial linkage of just a few databases.
A full examination of just how much information these databases
track is beyond the scope of this article; however, one commentator
has suggested that
the database problem cannot adequately be understood
by way of the Big Brother metaphor—even when adapted to
account for private sector databases. Although the Big
Brother metaphor certainly describes particular facets of the
problem, . . . [the more apropos metaphor is] Franz Kafka’s
depiction of bureaucracy in THE TRIAL—a more thoughtless
process of bureaucratic indifference, arbitrary errors, and
dehumanization, a world where people feel powerless and
vulnerable, without any meaningful form of participation in
the collection and use of their information.29
B. The Components of Facial Scanning

Turning from the question of databases generally to the more
specific consideration of using these databases for law enforcement
purposes, it is important to begin by examining the underlying steps
involved in a particular scan.
A database of information, in itself, tells us very little about
future activity. Although it is sometimes useful in predicting future
events from patterns of empirical criminal behavior, the real goal of
maintaining a large amount of biometric information is to reconstruct
the past.
Investigators arrive at a crime scene and must attempt to piece

Bill Would Require Fingerprint to Apply for Driver’s License, TOPEKA CAPITAL JOURNAL
(Mar. 12, 2002) at C3, available at 2002 WL 4880417 (“Under the proposal, the Division of
Motor Vehicles would keep a database of ‘‘biometric identifiers,’’ which could include a
thumbprint, retinal scan, face recognition or hand geometry.”).
26. Id.
27. Robert W. Schumacher II, Expanding New York’s DNA Database: The Future of
Law Enforcement, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1635, 1644 (1999).
28. See McGregor McCance, Device Keeps Problems in Check; Fingerprinting
Frustrates Forgers, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Mar. 3, 2002) at E-8, available at 2002
WL 7193592 (describing how convenience store owners are beginning to use fingerprint
scans and biometric databases to catch check forgers).
29. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1398 (2001).
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together what happened at that location from small clues: a
fingerprint, a strand of hair, skin cells, or semen. In each case, a piece
of physical evidence taken from a crime scene is checked against
existing records to determine if a match exists. If a match is found,
the investigator’s job is made easier; if not, the information is stored
in the computer and available for future cataloguing and crosschecking.
At an abstract level, the database scan involves three steps. First,
baseline information is entered into the database. This information
could be fingerprint information, DNA information, or something
else entirely. The information may be obtained through some
standard arrest procedure,30 from a professional regulatory body,31
from an insurer, or by alternative means. Second, comparison
information must be acquired from another source.
Lifting
fingerprints or other DNA information from a crime scene is one way
in which comparative data might be acquired. Third, the two pieces
of information must be checked against each other. This is the phase
at which an individual or a computer checks the anonymous
comparative data against the baseline data and determines if the two
pieces of biometric data originated from the same source. The
outcome of such an analysis is binary; that is, at the end of the process
one is left with a statement that is either true or false. The two pieces
of biometric information came from the same person or they did not.
Facial scanning operates much like other forms of biometric

30. One commentator has described the process of police fingerprinting in some
detail, stating that
[w]hen the local police arrest a suspect, they normally fingerprint the suspect.
They take at least one set of fingerprints each on an FD-249 and an R-84 and
also record other relevant data on both cards. If the local police do not
immediately resolve the offense (for example, the suspect must await trial), they
send the fingerprint card (FD-249) to the CJIS, but keep the R-84 for future use.
When the CJIS receives the FD-249, it enters the information in the NCIC.
When the charges against the suspect are resolved (for example, by conviction),
the police fill in the disposition on the retained R-84 and send it to the CJIS. The
CJIS then matches the R-84 to the previously sent FD-249 and updates the
information on the NCIC, including the conviction. If the CJIS, for whatever
reason, cannot locate an FD-249 for the suspect for that particular offense, the
CJIS returns the R-84 to the submitting agency. Once entered in the NCIC, the
information about the suspect, including the conviction, is available to all other
authorized agencies for their use.
Major Michael J. Hargis, Three Strikes and You Are Out – The Realities of Military and
State Criminal Record Reporting, 1995-SEP ARMY LAW. 3, 5 (1995).
31. For instance, in order to join the bar in some states, one must submit to
fingerprinting. See Alaska Bar Association, Reciprocity Application and Instructions,
available at <http://www.alaskabar.org/526.cfm> (last visited Apr. 2, 2002).

2002]

FACING THE MUSIC

73

identification. In order to make the system work, there must first be
a database of baseline images against which the comparative image
can be examined.32 The comparative image must then be acquired
from an input source and analyzed against the baseline data. On the
surface, these processes look very similar, but as one looks more
closely, the differences become clear.

III. Facial Scanning as a Fourth Amendment Event
A. Katz and Its Progeny
33

1. United States v. Katz

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees that individuals shall be free from “unreasonable searches
and seizures.”34 A substantial amount of judicial time and effort has
been expended developing the legal contours of what constitutes a
search. The seminal case on this issue is United States v. Katz, which
laid the foundation—in Justice Harlan’s concurrence—a seemingly
simple two-pronged test.35 The test provides that a governmental
action constitutes a search if an individual has a subjective
expectation of privacy and if society is willing to objectively recognize
that expectation as reasonable.36
Katz broke from prior law in that it shifted from an
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that focused on sacrosanct
spaces to a broader view of privacy as tied to the individual.37 But as
much as Katz gave in the way of an expanded notion of privacy, it
sustained an important caveat: that society is not prepared to concede
the existence of privacy where the action in question is openly
displayed to the public.38 As a result, that which is done or said in a
space that can be viewed or overheard by a member of the general
32. See Smart Cards Could Cut Airport Wait Times for Frequent Flyers, AIRLINE
INDUSTRY INFORMATION (U.K.) (Apr. 1, 2002) (“The cards would store personal
information about the holder on a magnetic strip or computer chip and they would be
used in conjunction with biometric measurements such as a scan of the user’s iris, face,
hand or fingerprint. At security checkpoints, the person would submit to at least one
biometric measurement, the results of which would be compared to an image stored in a
database or on the card itself.”).
33. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
36. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
37. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
38. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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public is not off limits to law enforcement officials merely because
they are an arm of the government.
Two of the Court’s subsequent cases demonstrate how large an
exception the public view doctrine carves into the Fourth
Amendment.
2. Smith v. Maryland

39

In Smith v. Maryland, the Court held that an individual did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he
dialed.40 Smith involved a case in which the phone company—at the
request of police but without a warrant from a magistrate—placed a
pen register on Smith’s telephone line in order to ascertain what
numbers he was dialing.41 Smith sought to suppress evidence
obtained from the pen register, arguing that he had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed and that his
expectation was reasonable.42
The Court disagreed, arguing that society is unwilling to accept
that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers one dials.43 Pointing to the fact that people are generally
aware that the phone company keeps track of long distance numbers
for billing purposes, the Court found that the use of a pen register to
track local numbers produced no additional incremental invasion of
privacy.44 In addition, the Court asserted that because a phone
number does not expose the content of the actual phone conversation
and is not content in itself, it does not constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.45
The potential impact of Smith in light of the growing necessity of
the Internet, and more specifically e-mail, as a form of
communication is unclear. A number of scholars have already
expressed concern about justifying the constitutionality of the
Carnivore46 system on Smith.47 Although a lengthier discussion of
39. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
40. Id. at 742.
41. Id. at 739, n.4
42. Id. at 742.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. The FBI e-mail surveillance system, Carnivore, works like a kind of Internet
wiretap that tracks emails and other electronic communications. Agents use it only after
obtaining a court order that allows them to intercept the communications of a criminal
suspect. The FBI then install the specialized computer on the networks of Internet
providers, where it “sniffs” out all mail and records sent to or from the target of an
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these issues is beyond the scope of this article, it is nevertheless
important to recognize that as the law currently stands, the utilization
of technology to intercept information traveling through the public
domain does not amount to a constitutional search event under the
Fourth Amendment.48
This sobering realization provides two alternatives. The first
possibility is that non-content based communications will never be
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Alternatively, an information
transfer may constitute a search, but requires something more than
the trace of a numerical signature,49 as in Smith, to invoke
constitutional protection.50 It is to this latter possibility that we will
return later in this section.51
3. California v. Ciraolo

52

In Ciraolo, the Court considered the issue of whether an
overflight of a person’s backyard that is surrounded by a high fence
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.53 In making the
threshold determination, the Court considered the two factors
established in Katz: Did Ciraolo have a subjective expectation of
privacy regarding the curtilage of his home and, if so, was society

investigation. Chris Oakes, ACLU: Law Needs ‘Carnivore’ Fix, WIRED (July 12, 2000),
available at <http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,37470,00.html> (last visited April
2, 2002).
47. See generally Christian David Hammel Schultz, Unrestricted Federal Agent:
‘Carnivore’and the Need to Revise the Pen Register Statute, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215,
1219 (2001) (discussing the need to revise the pen register statute so as to de-link
Carnivore from Smith).
48. Christopher S. Milligan, Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and
Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 295, 299 (1999).
49. I use the phrase “numerical signature” rather than phone number to sidestep the
issues presented by Carnivore as discussed in note 46.
50. As the Court articulated in Smith v. Maryland,
a pen register differs significantly from the listening device employed in Katz, for
pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications. This Court recently
noted: “Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from the
use of a pen register whether a communication existed. These devices do not
hear sound. They disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed . . .
a means of establishing communication. Neither the purport of any
communication between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities,
nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.”
Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167
(1977)).
51. See infra Part III.A.4.
52. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
53. Id. at 209.
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prepared to accept that expectation as reasonable?54
The Court gently waffled its way past the first issue, pointing out
that although the high fences and the geographic proximity of the
marijuana crop to his home evidenced some subjective expectation of
privacy, Ciraolo had not engaged in the most privacy-protecting
conduct.55 For instance, the Court remarked that Ciraolo did not
attempt to hide his gardening activities from the view of someone
standing on top of a double-decker bus or truck.56 As such, the Court
concluded that a mere hope that no one will see into an enclosed
space is different than a subjective manifestation of privacy.57
The Court disposed of the objective prong more easily,
concluding that because the public routinely flies over property in
commercial airplanes, society is unprepared to recognize the belief
that one’s property is free from aerial surveillance as objectively
reasonable.58
Ciraolo is particularly interesting for our purposes on two levels.
First, it is a case that deals with a space that has long been considered
deserving of the greatest level of protection from government
intrusion – the home and the areas immediately adjacent to it.
Second, it is not a case that squarely addresses the technology issue,
even though it is essential to the disposition of the case.59
The space question can be dismissed quickly, albeit not
perfunctorily. What Ciraolo apparently tells us is that even the most
sacred spaces are not immune from the government’s prying eyes. To
wit, if you want to sunbathe nude in your backyard, build a roof over
it. But if our expectations of privacy regarding our own backyards
are unreasonable, what can we expect of spaces away from the home?
The answer, seemingly, is very little.
Second, Ciraolo aptly demonstrates one of the primary sources
of concern about the Court’s current interpretation of searches under
the Fourth Amendment—that the ever-expanding power of
technology will continue to erode objective notions of privacy to the

54. Id. at 212.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 211.
57. Id. at 212.
58. Id. at 213. Justice Powell’s vigorous dissent poses an alternate view. “In my view,
the Court’s holding rests on only one obvious fact, namely, that the airspace generally is
open to all persons for travel in airplanes. The Court does not explain why this single fact
deprives citizens of their privacy interest in outdoor activities in an enclosed curtilage.”
Id. at 216 (Powell, J. dissenting).
59. Id. at 213-14.
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point that even the most significant invasions of privacy will be
commonplace.60 In Ciraolo, the notion that air transportation had
become, at the time of the decision, so ubiquitous as to negate an
objective expectation of privacy is telling.61 It suggests that the Court
may be less concerned with technological encroachments whose
primary purpose is not surveillance-oriented. Thus, the airplane is
not as threatening a technological intrusion as the spike mike, even if
the functional result of both is to diminish privacy.
The result of this reasoning is both confusing and ironic. The
Court has consistently ruled that enhancing technologies do not
constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment.62 Binoculars
merely enhance what an officer could see with his own eyes;63 night
vision goggles do much the same. Dog sniffs expand upon the sense of
smell.64 But barring an argument that airplanes just expand on our
ability to flap our arms, it’s hard to see what justifies the intrusion.
The pressures that erode privacy can therefore be seen as bidirectional: general technology raising the objectivity bar while sense-

60. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (discussing the
circularity of relying on an objective expectation of privacy that constantly shifts under the
pressure of new innovations).
61. Justice Berger’s opinion in Ciraolo expresses this notion explicitly when he
remarks that:
[o]ne can reasonably doubt that in 1967 Justice Harlan considered an aircraft
within the category of future “electronic” developments that could stealthily
intrude upon an individual’s privacy. In an age where private and commercial
flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect
that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being observed
with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet. The Fourth Amendment
simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this altitude
to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.
476 U.S. at 215. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Kyllo v. United States reiterates this
point all too clearly:
[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by
the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology. For example, as the cases discussed above make clear, the
technology enabling human flight has exposed to public view (and hence, we
have said, to official observation) uncovered portions of the house and its
curtilage that once were private. The question we confront today is what limits
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy.
533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (citations omitted).
62. See generally Alyson L. Rosenberg, Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging: A New
Weapon In the Fight Against Crime or a Fourth Amendment Violation?, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 135 (1998).
63. See David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The
New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1996).
64. See generally United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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enhancing technologies narrow the breadth of protection.
65

4. Kyllo v. United States

The Court’s most recent grapple with the threshold search
question was in Kyllo. At issue in that case was whether a thermal
scan of Kyllo’s residence constituted a presumptively unreasonable
search requiring a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.66
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the scan
was an unreasonable search. In making this determination, the Court
retraced its previous decisions, emphasizing the test cobbled from
Katz that there must be a subjective expectation of privacy that is
determined to be objectively reasonable.67 Bracketing Smith and
Ciraolo as cases where the defendant failed to meet his objective
burden under the Katz test, the majority took particular exception to
two aspects of the scan involved in Kyllo.
First, the Court emphasized its longstanding commitment to the
home as a particular zone of privacy worthy of the greatest degree of
protection.68 Within that space, it found that individual and societal
expectations of privacy are at their zenith.
Second, given the importance of the protected space, the Court
held that the use of specialized technology to acquire information
about the interior activities of a home, normally obtainable only from
a warranted search, was unreasonable per se. In making this
determination, the majority refused to accept the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis, adhered to by the dissent, that there is a discernible
distinction between devices that monitor data emanating from a
home as opposed to technologies that scan its interior. Justice Scalia
rejected the government’s position that
there is a fundamental difference between what it calls “offthe-wall” observations and “through-the-wall surveillance.”
But just as a thermal imager captures only heat emanating
from a house, so also a powerful directional microphone picks
up only sound emanating from a house-and a satellite capable
of scanning from many miles away would pick up only visible
light emanating from a house. We rejected such a mechanical
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz, where the
eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that

65.
66.
67.
68.

533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 29.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 31.
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reached the exterior of the phone booth. Reversing that
approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of
advancing technology—including imaging technology that
could discern all human activity in the home.69
In the wake of Kyllo, a critical question remains: Does the
Court’s decision apply only to specialized technologies aimed at the
home? In the narrowest reading, it seems that it would. The majority
is particularly concerned with intrusions into the home.70 But a
slightly broader reading could offer supporters of privacy more hope.
The Court’s notion of objective privacy hinges on whether or not
the technology performing the scan is in general use by the public.71
Furthermore, the reaffirmation of Katz in the Kyllo decision suggests
that notions of privacy remain tied to the individual rather than the
space.72 As a result, although it’s clear from the decision in Kyllo that
the reason why the Court is quick to invalidate the search is because
it intrudes into the home, it does not follow that the home is the only
locus of protection; it just means that applying the rationale of Katz
to other spaces is more problematic.73
Operating within the framework established by Kyllo and its
predecessors, the possible constitutional challenges to wide area facial
scans begin to emerge more clearly.
B. To Scan or Not to Scan?

After the incidents of September 11, law enforcement officials
69. Id. at 35-36.
70. Id. at 31.
71. The majority remarks that
obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior
of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
“intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,” constitutes a search—at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This
assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. On the basis of this criterion, the
information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a
search.
Id. at 34-35 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 32-33.
73. Justice Scalia notes that
[w]hile it may be difficult to refine Katz when the search of areas such as
telephone booths, automobiles, or even the curtilage and uncovered portions of
residences are at issue, in the case of the search of the interior of homes—the
prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy—
there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.
Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
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are under extreme pressure to protect against future catastrophes.74
In this climate, numerous means of crime prevention have been
bandied about, including national identity cards and state-sanctioned
torture.75 Focusing on facial scanning as one of these preventive
strategies, this section considers whether or not such an activity rises
to the level of a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Before directly answering the question, it is worthwhile to spend
some time looking at where the technology stands today—where it is
being deployed, how it is being used, and who is watching.
1. Scanners, Scanners Everywhere . . .

In early 2001, some 72,000 fans attending Superbowl XXXV
were facially scanned while entering the turnstiles of Raymond James
Stadium in Tampa.76 Using technology called FaceTrac, 128 points of
each attendee’s face were scanned and checked against an FBI crime
database.77 Although no arrests were made, 19 known criminals were
identified as a result of the scan.78 At the time, privacy groups
condemned the government’s actions,79 but in the wake of the World
Trade Center attacks, resistance to the use of this technology is
quickly fading away.80
In fact, a number of airports in various cities already have the
technology in place, including: Tampa,81 London,82 Fresno,83

74. Molly Ivins, Post Sept. 11: For Those Who’ve Lost Their Common Sense, CHIC.
TRIB., Nov. 15, 2001, at 31, available at 2001 WL 4135953; Rene Sanchez, Border Patrol
Agents Answer Higher Call, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2001, at A12, available at 2001 WL
30329602.
75. Conor O’Clery, A Strange Turn-up for the Book, IRISH TIMES (Feb. 16, 2002) at
59, available at 2002 WL 12662419 (citing Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz as one
such proponent of these schemes).
76. Mark Hollands, We Don’t Need IT to Make Us Stupid, THE AUSTRALIAN, Feb.
13, 2001, at 48.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Robert Trigaux, In Riskier World, Personal Security Trumps Personal Privacy, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, at 1H, available at 2002 WL 12607101.
80. An October 2001 Harris Poll indicated that “86 percent of respondents favored
the use of facial recognition devices to scan for terrorists in public places.” Kathryn
Balint, No ‘Snooper-Bowl’ for San Diego Police: Won’t be Using Face-Scanning
Technology That Sparked Ire in Tampa, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 20, 2003, at
E1, available at 2003 WL 6561326.
81. Biometrics: A Security Boon or Invasion of Individual Privacy, CORRECTIONS
PROFESSIONAL, Mar. 25, 2002.
82. Id.
83. Biometrics’ Time Has Come, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT RISK, Feb. 2002, at 8.
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Providence,84 Kansas City,85 Boston,86 and shortly Washington D.C.87
Virginia Beach is using the technology at the Ocenfront to track
“runaways, wanted felons and people suffering from dementia.”88 In
San Francisco, at least 30 high-resolution cameras are being installed
at every Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) stop to scan passengers
moving throughout the city.89
Remarking on the growing omnipresence of cameras, former
National Security Agency counsel Stewart Baker suggested that
“‘George Orwell underestimated our enthusiasm for surveillance. . . .
He correctly predicted we’d have cameras everywhere. What he
failed to imagine is that we’d want them so bad[ly] we’d pay for
them.’”90
This mentality is reflected by security specialists preparing for
potential terrorist strikes on sports arenas, who are eager to use face
scanning devices like the ones operated at the Superbowl in Tampa.91
Furthermore, “[f]acilities managers are working closely with law
enforcement, watching for” danger signs like “[m]eetings and public
protests by dissident groups.”92
In short, public support for increased security measures is so high
that the political checks that should operate to preserve privacy
measures cannot reliably operate. As such, it is the judiciary who will
likely have to take a leading role in safeguarding the general public
from itself.
2. Making Facial Scanning a Search

By all indications, convincing courts to treat facial scanning as a
search under the Fourth Amendment is at least an uphill battle, and
at most, impossible. At least one commentator addressing the issue

84. Mary Kirby, More U.S. Airports Acquire Visionics Biometric Systems, AIR
TRANSPORT INTELLIGENCE, Jan. 24, 2002.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See supra n. 80.
88. Warren Fiske, House Panel Backs Face-Scanning Limit, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Feb. 8, 2002, at B4, available at 2002 WL 5486691.
89. David Streitfeld & Charles Piller, A Changed America; Big Brother Finds Ally in
Once-Wary High Tech, Los Angeles Times (Jan. 19, 2002) at A1, available at 2002 WL
2447524.
90. Id.
91. Edward Iwata, Stadium Security Gets Serious, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 18, 2002, at
3B, available at 2002 WL 4722024.
92. Id.
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suggests that facial scans are unlikely to rise to the level of a search.93
As discussed earlier, the public view doctrine established in Katz and
subsequently expounded in Smith and Ciraolo probably encompasses
all of the spaces in which an individual might be subject to a facial
scan.94 Because airports, public transit stations, and sport stadiums
are all open spaces in which an individual’s face could be readily
viewed and identified by a police officer, the use of a video camera to
achieve the same end, arguably, is no different.
In spite of this fact, I argue that wide area facial scans should rise
to the level of a search for two reasons. First, as a practical matter,
the scans enable access to so much more information than would be
available to the public view of the police officer that some level of
Fourth Amendment protection seems necessary. Second, to the
extent that an analogy is possible, facial scans operate much like a
consensual encounter between civilians and law enforcement officials.
But unlike a stop-and-identify situation where a person is free to
refuse a policeman’s request, the lack of consensuality involved in
facial scanning—notably, the inability to refuse the encounter—
produces a constitutionally significant event.
a. Approaching the Problem

As mentioned, finding a precise analog between wide area facial
scans conducted by computers and traditional forms of police activity
is difficult because the scans have an amorphous quality that is
difficult to characterize precisely.
In particular, the level of
invasiveness of a scan depends, in large part, on the way the system
works.
For instance, the FaceIt system developed by Visionics, Inc. is
capable of recognizing single or multiple faces in either one-to-one or
one-to-many matching mode.95 Depending on the implementation of
the system, authorities may have access to a relatively small pool of
images in the database96 or an extremely large number.97
93. Milligan, supra n. 48, at 318.
94. See supra Part III.A.1.
Faceit
Face
Recognition
Technology,
95. Identix,
available
at
<http://www.indentix.com/newsroom/whatisfaceit.html> (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
96. See William Welsh, Facing Trouble, WASHINGTON TECHNOLOGY, at
<http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/16_21/state/17781-1.html> (last visited Mar.
3, 2003) (reporting that the Tampa system currently has only 900 entries in its database,
but will soon expand to 45,000).
97. Visionics, Inc., ID Solutions, available at <http://www.visionics.com/faceit/
apps/idsol.html> (last visited Mar. 31, 2002). (“There are estimated to be 1.1 billion facial
images in identification databases around the world. No re-enrollment is required.”)
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Furthermore, depending on the level of integration, the system could
return only the name of the individual or it could return crossreferenced data available in any linked database. This could
potentially include any criminal information, tax information, credit
information, health information, and vehicle registration information.
Likewise, the database could be read-only, which would prevent the
system from adding information, or it could be writable, allowing the
system to automatically add certain details every time it found a
match. This information could include the time at which the match
was made, the location of the camera making the match, and possibly
the images of individuals photographed shortly before or after a
match. In effect, simply by hooking the right databases together, law
enforcement officials could track the movements of an individual, the
people with whom she associated, and any other information tied into
the system. To give an extreme, but not unfathomable example, each
time one stopped at a toll, stepped on the subway, passed through a
turnstile, withdrew money from an ATM, or went to work, the system
could keep a record, and this would be made possible by the
mandatory photo identification issued by each state’s Department of
Motor Vehicles.
b. Applying the Katz analysis

Given the diversity of systems that can and have been
implemented in various jurisdictions, coupled with the ease with
which a system could be upgraded or downgraded as necessary,
attempting to argue that particular versions of the system may or may
not be legitimate would be futile. As such, this argument proceeds
under the notion that a brightline rule is more appropriate than a
case-by-case analysis for the purposes of categorizing any given facial
scanning activity as an event under the Fourth Amendment.
Operating from this premise, we briefly revisit the dual-tiered
requirement of Katz: that the government engages in a search when it
violates an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable.98
1. The Subjective Prong
To what extent do individuals have a subjective expectation of
not being facially scanned when they appear in public? The answer to
this question necessarily depends on the individual. Nevertheless,
98. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
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there are some fairly good reasons why any particular person might
have a subjective expectation of privacy that he is not being scanned.
Conceding that most people have no subjective expectation that
they will not be watched or captured on videotape as they move
about in public, there must be something more that the individual is
relying on in order to meet the first prong of Katz. One possibility is
that although an individual expects to be seen by the government, he
does not expect to be recognized by the government. That is, absent
specific illicit conduct that would give the government a reason to
learn his name, there is an expectation by all but the most paranoid
elements of society that the government is not watching for “you in
particular”. Another possibility is that even if one expects to be
identified, there is still no expectation that that identification will be
tied to a veritable cornucopia of data detailing the most intimate
details of one’s life. In either case, most people would likely have
some subjective expectation of privacy as they move about in public,
even though that expectation is substantially less than they would
expect in a more intimate space like the home.
2. The Objective Prong
The more difficult question is whether such an expectation would
be recognized by society as reasonable. As discussed above, the
Court’s analysis of this prong is linked to two factors.99 First, to what
extent is the technology in question being used by the general public?
Second, does the technology allow law enforcement to achieve an
objective that would normally be circumscribed by the Fourth
Amendment?
The first issue can be disposed with fairly easily. Although the
individual elements of facial scanning technology are widely
available: cameras, recognition software, and databases,100 the power
of a scanning system is its breadth: the dizzying quantity of
interlinked cameras and baseline databases. To that extent, facial
scanning systems are in no more common use by the general public
than was the thermal sensing technology used in Kyllo.
The more difficult question is whether the technology provides

99. See supra Part III.A.4.
100. Mark Boal, Spycam City, THE VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 6, 1998) at 38, available at
1998 WL 20492919. (“A hundred bucks at a computer store already buys face-recognition
software that was classified six years ago, which means that stored images can be called up
according to biometric fingerprints.”).
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an end run around the Fourth Amendment. Arguably, it does for a
number of reasons. First, although law enforcement officials claim
that facial scanning systems merely allow “machines to do what . . .
[police have] always done” by “giv[ing] policemen pictures and
put[ting] them on every corner,”101 in truth the two activities are quite
different.
Under the traditional method, police start with specific,
articulable information: a person for whom they are looking; a reason
why they are looking for that person. The police then take a
photograph of that person and compare the face of each person that
passes them against the baseline photograph. In the parlance of
Visionics’ technology, this is a one-to-one match: each new face is
matched against one existing face.102
When the computer performs a wide area scan (or one-to-many
match),103 it engages in a task that no police officer individually, or
any police force as a whole, could achieve. It examines each face
against as many as a billion faces for a match.104 But more
importantly, it does so for no reason. A wide area scan is not looking
for someone in particular; it is looking for anyone, suspicious or not,
who happens to wander past. Furthermore, to the extent that the
database tracks the location of faces it successfully scans, it operates
as a homing device on a person’s movements. In the words of one
commentator:
The new surveillance goes beyond merely invading
privacy . . . to making irrelevant many of the constraints that
protected privacy.” For example, mass monitoring allows
police to eliminate cumbersome court hearings and warrants.
Immediately after a crime, cops check cameras in the vicinity
that may have captured the perpetrator on tape. So, as
surveillance expands, it has the effect of enlarging the reach of
the police. Once it becomes possible to bank all these images,
and to call them up by physical topology, it will be feasible to
set up an electronic sentry system giving police access to every
105
citizen’s comings and goings.

101. Warren Fiske, House Panel Backs Face-Scanning Limit, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Feb. 8, 2002, at B4, available at 1998 WL 20492919.
102. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
103. Id.
104. Visionics, Inc., ID Solutions, supra n. 97.
105. Boal, supra n. 100 at 38.
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Of course, the technology feared by that author in 1998 is now a
reality.
c. The Nature of the Search

Accepting for the moment, arguendo, that a search has occurred,
the question remains: what kind of search? The obvious problem is
that a facial scan doesn’t look like the kind of searches we’re worried
about - the kind where the contents of someone’s house are
rummaged while looking for a particular item.
In order to find the answer to this question, we have to look past
the basic scan, the recognition of one picture against another, to what
the scan really does: it correlates a data set, pinpointing where a
particular person is a particular time. And more importantly, the
cumulative effect of each identification is a more substantial
intrusion; it is a map of human behavior, a list of the idiosyncrasies
that make each person unique.
But even if the accretion and tracking of data regarding an
individual’s movement does not seem like the kind of search typically
protected by the Fourth Amendment, the outcome of the facial scan
appears less legitimate viewed through the lens of Terry v. Ohio and
its progeny. In this section, I argue that wide area facial scanning
operates as a kind of Fourth Amendment event that is short of a
Terry stop, but is necessarily implied by the balancing analysis
developed in — and subsequent interpretation of —Terry. In order
to demonstrate this point, I briefly track a series of cases that define
the basic contours of the law in this area.
C. Facial Scanning as a Fourth Amendment Event

A stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment106 that is
justified by an amount of suspicion less than probable cause.107 It is
one tool in an arsenal of weapons available to law enforcement to
respond to “rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city
streets.”108 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court allowed a stop and
frisk based on the reasonable suspicion of a police officer that Mr.

106. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). (“It must be recognized that whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’
that person.”)
107. Id. at 27. (“[T]here must be narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has
probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”)
108. Id. at 10.
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Terry was preparing to engage in unlawful activity.109 The Court held
that the governmental intrusion of a stop and frisk is justified when a
police officer can “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts” are deemed
objectively reasonable at the time of the intrusion.110
In essence, the creation of the balancing test in Terry111 created a
sliding scale of interaction between the individual and the police. In
ascending order, we have the consensual encounter, the investigative
stop, the quasi-arrest, and the custodial arrest. Because of the fluidity
of defining what constitutes a stop, it is worthwhile to briefly examine
this question in more detail.
1. What makes a stop a stop?

The Court began to flesh out the question of what constitutes a
stop in United States v. Mendenhall.112 That case involved an
encounter between Mendenhall and Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agents at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport.
Believing Mendenhall’s actions to be consistent with the “drug
courier profile,”113 the agents stopped her and requested to see her
identificationand airline tickets.114 After noting a name discrepancy
between the two requested items, she was asked to accompany one of
the agents to the DEA office for further questioning.115 Although she
did not verbally agree to further inquiries, she did follow the agent to
the office.116 In turn, heroin was discovered on her person and she
moved to suppress the evidence prior to trial.117
Refusing to grant Mendenhall’s request to suppress, the Court
held that the initial encounter between the government and the
defendant was consensual and did not rise to the level of a seizure.118
In determining the moment at which an individual is seized for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the court indicated that “a
person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force or a show of

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 28.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 21.
446 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1980).
Id. at 548 n.1.
Id. at 547-48.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 555.
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authority, his freedom of movement is restrainted.”119 Elaborating
further upon the standard, the Court reasoned that “[a]s long as the
person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the
questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that
person’s liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require
some particularized and objective justification.”120
The physical requirement of being able to “walk away” in
Mendenhall was amended in Florida v. Bostick, where the defendant
was naturally restrained as a result of the fact that the questioning
involved in that instance took place on a bus.121 Nevertheless, the
Court sustained the basic framework of Mendenhall and concluded
that:
Bostick’s freedom of movement was restricted by a
factor independent of police conduct — i.e. by his
being a passenger on a bus. Accordingly, the ‘free to
leave’ analysis on which Bostick relies is inapplicable.
In such a situation, the appropriate inquiry is whether
a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.122
The net effect of the Mendenhall-Bostick inquiry is that a court
must assess whether an individual had the ability to choose not to be
subjected to questioning by the government. Put simply, the
consensual encounter between the government and the individual
hinges on the consent of the individual.
2. The Hodari Problem

The same term that the Court decided Bostick, it also ruled on
123
Hodari involved a juvenile offender who
California v. Hodari D.
fled from a police officer preparing to engage in a consensual
encounter. The officer chased Hodari and just as he was about to
intercept him, Hodari discarded a rock-like substance that police
ultimately determined to be crack cocaine. In his motion to suppress
the illicit drugs, Hodari argued that he had been constructively seized
upon apprehension of the police officer’s imminent physical control.
In another opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991).
Id. at 436.
499 U.S. 621 (1991).

2002]

FACING THE MUSIC

89

this argument, contending that seizure constitutes a literal “taking
possession.”124 Under this analysis, a seizure is not effectuated until
there is either “a laying on of hands or application of physical force to
restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.”125
The Hodari problem, in the context of facial scanning, is that
when a computer scans an individual’s face, no physical seizure
occurs. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the scan can be as or more
intrusive than a physical stop. The lingering question, to which I now
turn, is whether it is possible to reconcile facial scans as a kind of
Fourth Amendment event within the defined limits of the previously
discussed case law.
3. Facial Scanning, Consensual Encounters, and Implied Consent

A successful facial scan provides law enforcement with
information about the individual that the computer has detected. As
mentioned earlier, this information could be quite detailed or fairly
minimal depending on the level of sophistication of the database.126
Admittedly, the type of database being used will likely factor into the
totality of the circumstances that define whether or not a seizure has
occurred.127 Nevertheless, we can proceed under the modest view that
a local police station will have access to the following pieces of
information: the name of an individual, the individual’s social security
number, the last-known address of the individual, the place at which
the scan was obtained, the time at which the scan was obtained, and
the criminal history of the individual scanned.128
Courts examining the specific moment at which a consensual
encounter morphs into a seizure have repeatedly returned to the
requirement established in Mendenhall and Bostick that an individual
“feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the

124. Id. at 624.
125. Id. at 626.
126. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
127. For instance, a system that provided only a name match would be unlikely to rise
to the level of a stop in the sense that I discuss below. But it is unlikely that such a system
would be particularly valuable to law enforcement, because it provides no additional
information that would be useful in preventing the commission of crimes.
128. As a practical matter, police are likely to have all of this information and more.
Many states have in fact begun to put this information on-line for the general public. See
Texas Department of Safety Crime Records Service, Sex Offender Database, at
<http://records.txdps.state.tx.us/soSearch/soSearch.cfm> (last visited Apr. 1, 2003)
(providing public information on the height, weight, sex, eye color, threat level, lastknown address, and shoe size of various sex offenders).
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encounter.”129 In practice, consensual encounters often begin by
establishing the identity of the individual being questioned.130 This
initial moment of interaction between law enforcement officials and a
potential suspect is the critical point at which the individual must
assert her right to terminate the encounter because as soon as she
accedes to the initial demand to identify herself, she may have already
unwittingly provided enough evidence to rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion.131
As for facial scanning, the same analysis applies. The moment at
which the computer system recognizes an individual, ascertaining
where she is at a particular time and tying that information to where
she lives, her criminal record, and any other personal information
available in the database, police may already have enough
information to provide them with reasonable suspicion to satisfy the
requirements of the Terry doctrine.
As my argument stands, however, there is still no reason to
distinguish a facial scan from an ordinary consensual encounter
between law enforcement and a suspect. For the purposes of
situating my ongoing discussion, it is useful to establish a visual
representation of what kind of governmental interventions we know
about in order to determine where facial scanning might fit.
Level of Suspicion
Probable Cause
Probable Cause
Reasonable Suspicion
None

Governmental Intrusion
Custodial Arrest
Quasi-Arrest
Terry Stop
Consensual Encounter

From this chart we conclude that different types of interventions
require different levels of suspicion in order to support the
governmental intrusion. Facial scans are problematic in that they
don’t quite rise to the level of a Terry stop because there is no
physical seizure, and yet, the facial scan itself engages in a kind of
questioning without consent. As such, a scan is somewhere between a

129. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
130. See e.g., Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547-48; Bostick, 501 U.S. at 441; Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 494 (1983); U.S. v. Hutchinson, 268 F.3d 1117, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 2001); U.S. v.
Parra-Garcia, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 106, at *5 (10th Cir. 2001).
131. For instance, Ms. Mendenhall’s identification of herself, coupled with the
discrepancy on her ticket, provided police sufficient reason to be suspicious that she might
be a drug courier. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547-48.
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consensual encounter and a Terry stop. Thus, a facial scan requires
some level of suspicion greater than zero, yet less than reasonable
suspicion, in order to be considered a valid Fourth Amendment
event.

IV. An Alternative Approach
This article has repeatedly emphasized the difference between
wide area scans and focused scans as tools of law enforcement.132 This
distinction is critical to finding an alternate solution that balances
society’s interest in preventing crime with the individual’s interest in
being free from governmental intrusions.133
This section first considers and rejects a state legislative solution
to the problem of wide area scans before proposing a more
comprehensive judicial solution.

132. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
133. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37
(1967)). (“[I]t is necessary ‘first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private
citizen,’ for there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.’”).
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134

In response to the city of Virginia Beach’s implementation of

134. Va H.B. 454, Leg. Sess. (Feb. 11, 2002). The bill provides, in part, that:
A. . . . no locality or law-enforcement agency shall employ facial recognition technology
prior to complying with all of the provisions of this chapter.
B. The Attorney General or his designee, in any case where the Attorney General is
authorized by law to prosecute or pursuant to a request in his official capacity of an
attorney for the Commonwealth in any city or county, or an attorney for the
Commonwealth, may apply to the circuit court, for the jurisdiction where the proposed
facial recognition technology is to be used, for an order authorizing the placement of facial
recognition technology by any law-enforcement agency in the jurisdiction, when the
technology may reasonably be expected to provide (i) evidence of the commission of a
felony or Class 1 misdemeanor, (ii) a match of persons with outstanding felony warrants,
(iii) a match of persons or class of persons who are identifiable as affiliated with a terrorist
organization, or (iv) a match of persons reported to a law-enforcement agency as
missing. . . .
A. Each application for an order authorizing the use of facial recognition technology
shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to the circuit court and shall state the
applicant’s authority to make the application. Each application shall be verified by the
applicant to the best of his knowledge and belief and shall include the following
information:
1. The identity of the applicant and the law-enforcement agency;
2. A full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the
applicant in support of his request that an order be issued, including, but not limited to, (i)
details either as to the particular offenses that have been, are being or are about to be
committed, or the event or appearance that would attract individuals affiliated with a
terrorist organization; (ii) a specific description of the nature and location of the facilities
where or the place from which the facial recognition technology is to be used; (iii) a
description of the type of match being sought; (iv) the identity of any persons or class of
persons sought by the use of facial recognition technology . . . and (v) a description of the
type of facial recognition technology to be used and a description of the contents of the
database;
3. A statement of the period of time for which facial recognition technology is required
to be maintained. However, in no case shall any request for an order granting the use of
facial recognition technology be for longer than a period of ninety days; . . . .
B. If the court determines on the basis of the facts submitted that the provisions of this
chapter have been met, and upon submission of a proper application, the court shall enter
an order, as requested or as modified, authorizing the use of facial recognition technology
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The application and any order granted or
denied may be sealed by the court. . . .
9. The requirement that any facial image captured that is not relevant to (i) evidence of
the commission of a felony or Class 1 misdemeanor, (ii) a match of persons with
outstanding felony warrants, (iii) a match of persons or class of persons who are
identifiable as affiliated with a terrorist organization, or (iv) a match of persons reported
to a law-enforcement agency as missing shall be disposed of as soon as possible, but in no
event be retained for more than ten days. . . .
A. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to security measures undertaken at (i)
public-use airports in the Commonwealth or (ii) harbors and seaports of the
Commonwealth.
B. Any information acquired through facial recognition technology prior to July 1, 2002,
shall be admissible in evidence in any suit, action or proceeding.
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facial recognition technology at the Oceanfront, the State of Virginia
House of Delegates passed a bill to severely circumscribe the use of
the system.135 Virginia’s proposed scheme requires law enforcement
officials to acquire authorization from the circuit court before
installing scanning technology and only when the technology is
reasonably likely to provide information pertaining to the commission
of a felony, individuals with outstanding felony warrants, terrorists, or
missing persons.136
In addition, the bill limits use of the installed system to 90 days,
provides for court oversight, caps extensions to 60 days or less, and
requires the deletion of images of all persons not falling into one of
the four enumerated categories “as soon as possible, but in no
event . . . for more than ten days.”137
The text of the bill also provides for a series of exceptions to the
requirements of the bill. First, the bill is not intended to curtail
security measures taken to protect various ports of entry such as
public airports and harbors.138 In addition, the bill provides for a
grace period during which time any evidence received from scans is
admissible in court.139
While the House of Delegates’ actions are certainly a step in the
right direction, a number of problems remain with respect to privacy
issues.140
First, although the bill enumerates four categories that would
justify use of the scanning technology, the categories themselves are
so broad that it would be virtually impossible for a court to deny
them. In particular, because prediction of future activity is almost
impossible absent explicit articulable facts, courts would likely have
to rely on statistical analyses to justify the request. For instance,
could a court reasonably deny a request to place scanners in an area
where a large number of runaways had been apprehended previously
using traditional methods? For that matter, should courts defer to
135. Facial Scan: Beach’s Use Restricted Under Bill Approved by House, THE
VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Feb. 13, 2002) at B4, available at 2002 WL 5487250.
136. Va H.B. 454, Leg. Sess.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (providing that “[a]ny information acquired through facial recognition
technology prior to July 1, 2002, shall be admissible in evidence in any suit, action, or
proceeding.”).
140. Most notably, the chances that the bill will be ratified by the Virginia Senate is
slim. See supra n. 98 (“The measure is expected to be passed by the full House next week
but may have a tough time in the state Senate. Sen. Kenneth W. Stolle, R-Virginia Beach,
vowed to vigorously oppose the legislation.”).
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police use of the technology in high crime areas? As a practical
matter, local judges are unlikely to deny police department requests
in all but the most exceptional cases.
Second, the fact that the bill controls the installation of the
technology rather than the type of search is problematic. As
discussed above, the real concern with wide area scans is that they
cast an extremely wide net that brings a substantial number of
individuals for whom there is no suspicion of criminal activity within
the gaze of the state. Under the proposed bill, the arguably
unconstitutional activity is limited in temporal duration but not in
scope.
Third, to the extent that the bill requires a judicial decree each
time that law enforcement wants to use its system, it unnecessarily
hampers police from protecting society’s interest in the effective
investigation of criminal activity. Focusing on the type of search,
rather than the type of technology employed, is a more appropriate
solution.
Fourth, although the bill provides for the admissibility of
evidence acquired from facial scans prior to the cut-off date, it does
not explicitly provide for the exclusion of such evidence after the
grace period. The only punishment for failing to comply with the bill
is being held in contempt of court. Because the goal of exclusionary
rules is to deter future police misconduct, any statute that failed to
141
address this issue would likely be fatally flawed.
B. The Judicial Option

Having discussed some of the pitfalls of one specific legislative
solution, I consider what a judicially created solution might look like.
In proposing this solution, I do not rule out the possibility that a
legislative solution could provide some protection against the
invasiveness of facial scanning; nevertheless, the judiciary’s flexibility
to deal with particular fact situations on a case-by-case basis may
make it the superior forum for enforcing these rights.
My proposal is that the judiciary should recognize two types of
facial scans: wide area scans and focused scans, sometimes known as
one-to-one and one-to-many searches. As a general rule, the
141. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1979) (“There are two policies
behind the use of the exclusionary rule to effectuate the Fourth Amendment. When there
is a close causal connection between the illegal seizure and the confession, not only is
exclusion of the evidence more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future, but
also use of the evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity of the courts.”).
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judiciary should find that wide area scans are presumptively
unreasonable searches of the person because they are supported by
no level of suspicion. Nevertheless, law enforcement officials should
be allowed to use facial scanning for focused searches so long as they
believe that the use of such a scan is necessary to prevent the
commission of a crime or aid in the investigation of a crime that has
been committed. In practice, this could require police to have as little
as a hunch, as to any particular person’s potential involvement in
criminal conduct, in order to justify the scan. The requirement would
merely be intended to prevent wide area scans backed by no
suspicion at all.
The goals of establishing such a system are twofold: first, it would
reduce the number of individuals being processed and tracked by the
system for whom there is no suspicion of involvement in criminal
activity. Second, it would increase the probability that individuals
who have committed or are about to commit a crime have a greater
likelihood of being caught. In return, the increased likelihood of
detection should deter future crime.
Management of such a scheme by the judiciary is essential,
because the penalty for utilizing the scanning system in an authorized
way will be the exclusionary rule. Because the scan will often be the
first interaction between the police and the suspect, exclusion of all
fruits of the initial search will act as a super-deterrent to illicit uses of
the system.

V. Conclusion
The dystopic vision of a society in which the government tracks
its individuals once seemed like the stuff of science fiction: the work
of Orwell and Huxley, the abstract criticism of Foucault, the
demented ramblings of conspiracy theorists. The truth is that the new
millennium, pointedly ushered in by the attacks of September 11, has
shifted the frame. This new world does more than ignore the cries of
the lunatic fringe – it actively embraces the destruction of privacy
under the guise of increased security. What is lost in this process is
who we might need protection from: is it the next Joseph McCarthy?
the next Hitler?
To the extent that one can resist the impulses of political fervor,
the time is now. The incremental protections over which these battles
are fought may not seem so incremental in retrospect. In this context,
the oft quoted words of George Orwell, echoed in Justice Brennan’s
dissent in Florida v. Riley, ring eerily true:
The black-mustachio’d face gazed down from every
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commanding corner. There was one on the house front
immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the
captain said . . . In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down
between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a bluebottle,
and darted away again with a curving flight. It was the Police
Patrol, snooping into the people’s windows.142

142. 488 U.S. 445, 466 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting George Orwell,
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (1949).

